CEO Decision Horizon and Firm Performance – Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms by Bi, Guanyu
  
 








A Thesis  
In 




Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of Master of Science in Administration (Finance) at Concordia University 











© Guanyu Bi, 2017  
 CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY 
School of Graduate Studies 
 
 
This is to certify that the thesis prepared 
 
By:          Guanyu Bi 
Entitled:  CEO decision horizon and firm performance – evidence from Chinese listed firms 
 
and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN ADMINISTRATION (FINANCE) 
 
complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with 
respect to originality and quality. 
 
Signed by the final Examining Committee: 
 
_________ Dr. Kamal Argheyd ____________Chair 
 
 
_________Dr. Tingyu Zhou______________Examiner 
 
 
__________Dr. Ravi Mateti_______________Examiner 
 
 
__________Dr. Saif Ullah________________Supervisor 
                        
 
Approved by   ______________________________________________ 
Graduate Program Director 
 
 
Dean of Faculty 
 
 








CEO decision horizon and firm performance – evidence from 
Chinese listed firms 
Guanyu Bi 
ABSTRACT 
This study focuses on vertical agency problems (the conflicts between managers and 
shareholders), and analyzes the effect of top managers’ myopia action on firms’ 
performance in the background of China. We explore firms’ performance in three 
dimensions – agency costs, information risk and Tobin’s Q. We aim to expose the risk 
and benefit of firms to investors, when top managers occupy a stable position in a 
long period. Previous research on agency costs and information risk (Antia et al., 
2010) reports a negative correlation between information risk and decision horizon. 
We examine whether these results remain consistent in the world’s second-largest 
economy. 
We use expected CEO tenure as a proxy for the length of CEO decision horizon, and 
use annual sales scaled by total assets and SG&A (Selling, General and 
Administrative Expenses) scaled by total sales to measure agency costs. Five 
measures of accruals quality are used in this paper to measure information risk, which 
is the likelihood of the poor quality of disclosed firm-specific information. By using 
2-Stage Least Squares Regression to control endogenous problem of CEO decision 






more agency costs, more information risk and higher Tobin’s Q. The results are not 
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CEO decision horizon and firm performance – evidence from 
Chinese listed firms 
1. Introduction 
Corporate governance is important in modernized enterprises system. Since Berle and 
Means˄1932˅proposed the characteristic of dispersed ownership, separation of 
ownership and management agency problem remains the core research topic.  
Two types of agency problems may exit in firms: Vertical agency problems arise 
between owners and managers from the separation of ownership and control (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976); and horizontal agency problems between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders arise from their conflicting interests.    
One of the main sources of conflicts between managers and shareholders is that the 
investment horizons of managers are shorter than the investment horizons of 
shareholders. This is one aspect of managerial myopia. Managerial myopia, defined as 
an action that boosts current earnings at the expense of the long-term value, has been 
a lively topic in finance. Many studies focus on the causes of myopia, which include 
takeover threats (Stein, 1988), CEO’s equity-based compensation (Murphy, 2003), 
and capital market pressure (Bhojraj and Libby, 2005). However, most of the previous 
papers focus on the developed countries, whereas, there are few studies investigating 
the myopia problems in developing markets.  






system since the reform of non-tradable shares. The institutional environment for 
Chinese firms has two salient features: 1) China has transformed itself from a 
command economy to a market economy, and 2) Most Chinese-listed firms were 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) before the transformation. It is not difficult to 
understand that some financial phenomenon is different from developed countries as 
well as other developing countries. We investigate CEO’s managerial myopia in the 
context of China. In this paper, we use CEO decision horizon as a measure the of the 
myopia problem. On one hand, managerial decision horizons are limited to their 
expected tenures.  On the other hand, pressure from shareholders shortens CEOs’ 
decision horizons.   
In this study, we provide an empirical test on the relationship between CEO decision 
horizon and firm performance. We follow Antia et al. (2010)’s method and calculate 
our main test variable – decision horizon. As for our dependent variable, we have 
three dimensions of firm performance: agency cost, information risk and market 
valuation.  
In order to avoid endogeneity and potential omitted variable problems, we use two-
stage least square estimation (2SLS) for most of our model. The industry-averaged 
salary per capita is a valid instrumental variable because it is an industry 
characteristic. It links to CEO’s decision horizon and is not directly associated with 
firm performance.   






of main test variable – CEO’s decision horizon and 2) alternative measures of a series 
of control variables, and conclude that the results are robust.  
This paper is organized into 7 sections. Section 2 introduces previous literature. 
Section 3 provides the hypotheses development. Section 4 provides the variable 
construction, the data source and the summary statistics. Section 5 presents the 
methodology and empirical results. Section 6 summarizes the robustness tests and 
Section 7 concludes with an overview of the findings and limitations of this paper. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Managerial myopia in the context of China 
Many practitioners believe that myopia problem is a first-order problem at the face of 
many modern firms. Technological revolutions change people’s life style rapidly and 
forward-looking companies deposit a large amount of assets in their intangible assets 
such as human capital and R&D capabilities. Building such competencies require 
significant and sustained investment. However, managers may fail to invest with the 
concern of firm’s short-term share price, because such intangible investment may not 
bring back short-term profit. This is managerial myopia. CEO’s decision horizon, 
constructed by CEO’s age and his expected tenure, could serve as a measure of 
managerial myopia (Antia et al., 2010).  Indeed, Jensen and Meckling (1979) 
demonstrated that a shorter tenure increases the hurdle rate for projects causing 
managers to underinvest. Some managers may invest myopically and pursue 






and Marino, 1994). Graham et al. (2005) found that 78% of executives would 
sacrifice long-term value to meet earnings targets. Kaplan and Minton (2006) found 
that shorter expected tenure coincides with the increase in annual CEO pay over the 
same period.  
However, in the context of China, managers’ myopia problem is not widely discussed.  
There are few studies concerning managerial myopia in the Chinese market, as 
Chinese market went through an economic reform from planned economy to market-
oriented economy during past four decades. Corporate reforms, initiated in the 1980s, 
have handed plant managers autonomy in decision-making, reduced state interference 
in the production process, and significantly improved the managerial resource 
allocation system. After the reform, corporate governance problems, such as agency 
problems, came to Chinese domestic researcher’s sight. Using Chinese data from 
2007 to 2009, Wu and Li (2012) found that managers’ age and operational capacity 
have a significant negative impact on myopia problem, while salaries and managerial 
ownership do not clearly relate to myopia problem. Liu and Chen (2006) found that 
sensitivity of the company's investment to market valuation increases with the degree 
of managerial myopia and the market valuation of company increase with the 
company’s investment. They concluded that the strong sensitivity of book-to-market 






2.2 Agency cost, information risk and firm performance in the context of 
China 
Agency problems attract researchers around the worlds, since Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) first defined the concept of agency cost. Many studies focused on providing 
evidence of the existence of agency problem or finding a solution to the agency 
problem. The research of Bebchuk and Fried (2003) provided evidence that dispersed 
ownerships lack bargaining power against managers, and that managerial power 
approach can explain many features of the executive compensation landscape. 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) illustrated that large institutional shareholders have 
incentive to monitor of management. But this effect differs across the markets.  
Agency costs have been widely discussed in China since the majority of the Chinese 
firms transformed into state owned enterprises (SOEs) or private-owned firms around 
1990s. Lu and Zhou (2005) confirmed agency cost hypothesis in the listed companies. 
Huang et al. (2011) examined the effect of agency cost on the relation between top 
managers’ overconfidence and investment-cash flow sensitivity in the Chinese 
market, and their results showed that a positive relationship between overconfidence 
and investment-cash flow sensitivity does exist in firms with high agency costs. 
Information asymmetric between managers and dispersed ownerships or between 
informed investor and less-informed investors leads to information risk. Previous 
studies have provided evidence that information risk is a non-diversifiable factor that 






risk to the cost of capital (Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Francis et al., 2005; Core et al., 
2008). Furthermore, in the unique institutional background of China, Chen et al. 
(2011) found that the effects of information risk on cost of capital are more 
pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises than for state-owned enterprises. They 
regarded information risk as a market risk factor. Our paper tries to explore the reason 
of information risk from managers’ point of view. 
There are many studies focusing on the relationship between CEO turnover, CEO 
tenure and firm performance. Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) stated that both 
compensation changes and management changes are methods used to control top 
managers. Jenter and Kanaan (2015) present that CEOs are fired after bad firm 
performance, and bad firm performance could result from industry or the whole 
economy. Using Chinese data from 1998 to 2002, Kato and Long (2006) provided 
evidence that CEO turnover is significantly and inversely related to firm performance 
with a modest magnitude relationship. Henderson et al. (2006) argued that the 
relationship between CEO tenure and firm performance depends on the industry. In 
stable industries, such as food industry, performance improved steadily with tenure. 
For dynamic industries, such as IT industry, CEOs were at their best when they started 
their jobs. This opinion coincides with the paper of McClelland et al. (2012) that 
CEOs' paradigms will become increasingly obsolete as their tenure increases, with 






3. Hypothesis Development 
Hypothesis 1: Shorter CEO decision horizons are associated with greater agency 
costs.  
In the traditional corporate finance literature, agency costs such as the misalignment 
of managerial and shareholder’s interests, could be one explanation for investment 
distortions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This misalignment contains investment 
cycles, risk and returns of investment. Managers may over-invest excess cash flow for 
their private benefit, or they may expand expanses such as SG&A for the 
comfortableness when they are at high position. On one hand, CEO’s expected tenure 
is much shorter than the life span of the firm, so some long-run investments are 
avoided for this reason. On the other hand, over-confident CEOs may invest in some 
risky projects to chase their personal reputation.  
Ajinkya et al. (2005) analyzed that with the increase of capital market pressure, 
changes in disclosure frequency cause managers’ myopical decision. Cheng, 
Subramanyam and Zhang (2005) found that managers in firms which frequently issue 
quarterly earnings guidance behave more myopically than those of occasional guiders. 
Mizik and Jacobson (2007) found that myopic cuts of marketing spending impair 
marketing function, harm intangible marketing assets, and ultimately destroy 
shareholder value.  
According to Antia et al. (2010), agency costs negatively correlate with the increase 






(management myopia) are associated with high agency costs. However, the 
uniqueness of Chinese market exists from top to bottom.  On one hand, the 
privatization and reform of most Chinese listed firms make it difficult to figure out 
who is the beneficial owner, and a great portion of investors in the capital market are 
searching for buy-sell price differences in the short-run, not for the long-run 
investments. On the other hand, professional managers do not commonly exist in 
firms, and top managers, more or less, connect with the large shareholders. Therefore, 
whether this horizon problem remains the same in Chinese market is a question.  
Hypothesis 2: Shorter CEO decision horizons are associated with greater information 
risk. 
Using stock volatility as a measure of information risk, Clayton, Hartzell and 
Rosenberg (2000) found that information risks increase after CEO turnovers. Given 
that CEO turnover is indicative of short decision horizon, our second hypothesis states 
that shorter decision horizons are associated with greater information risk.  
Hypothesis 3: Shorter CEO decision horizons are associated with smaller market 
valuation. 
Kato and Long (2006) found that CEO turnover is significant and negatively 
correlated to firm performance in the Chinese market. Lausten (2002) found that CEO 
turnover inversely relate to firm performance in Danish market. Since shorter CEO 
decision horizons indicate higher probability of CEO turnover, this hypothesis states 






4. Variables and Data 
4.1 Variables  
4.1.1 Decision Horizon 
Our main independent variable is decision horizon (DH). We assume that CEOs 
estimate their tenure by comparing themselves with other CEOs in the same industry 
(Antia et al., 2010). Therefore, this comparability leads to two components of DH, 
their expected tenure, and their age compared with the median age in the same 
industry. If CEO makes a profitable long-run decision, but his tenure is shorter, he 
couldn’t get the maximum benefit from this decision. Therefore, his decision horizon 
relates to the expected tenure. Also, the decision horizon is related to age. The mean 
age of all observations is 49. Consider if the CEO is near his retirement, he would 
prefer projects with short-term profits to boom the stock price or accounting numbers 
in order to make him retire with honors and a good reputation. The average age and 
tenure in different industries varies a lot. For example, firms in the high technology 
industry usually hire younger CEOs for their updated knowledge of the high 
technology, and this difference makes the industry adjusted decision horizon 
necessary. Thus, we do not use the median tenure or median age of the whole sample 
as a comparison, but use industry adjusted median tenure and industry adjusted 
median age. We follow Antia et al. (2010), and construct DH as follows.  ܦܪ = (ܶܧܷܴܰܧ���,� − ܶܧܷܴܰܧ�,�) + (ܣܩܧ���,� − ܣܩܧ�,�)               ሺͳሻ 






age of the CEO at year t, and ܣܩܧ���,�   is the industry median of age at year t.  
4.1.2 Agency costs 
The first set of firm performance variables relates to the prevalence of agency costs. 
The classic case of agency cost is the professional manager having interests differing 
from those of shareholders. When shareholders make a decision to change their top 
manager, two things they must consider about: 1) the profit that manager can bring 
and 2) the cost of replacing and hiring manager. Agency costs relate to both, because 
agency costs serve as the deduction of profit resulting from managers’ action. The 
impact of decision horizon on agency costs should be taken into consideration, 
because decision horizon is one aspect of managerial myopia, which is always related 
to shareholders’ long-term profit.  
Hence, we conduct 2 measures of agency costs. First, following Ang et al. (1999)’s 
method, we use the ratio of annual sales to total assets (Agency cost1) (Equation 2) as 
a measure of managers' ability to employ assets efficiently. A higher asset turnover 
ratio indicates a higher value-creating ability which would lead to positive cash-flow 
and increase shareholder value. A lower asset turnover ratio could be regard as a non-
cash flow generating value destroying ventures, which harms shareholder profit. 
Firms with considerable agency conflicts would have a lower asset turnover ratio 
compare to those having less agency conflicts. Second, according to Singh and 
Davidson (2003), we use firm’s selling, general, and administrative expenses (SG&A) 






proxy of managerial discretionary expenses because these costs are an approximation 
of the managerial pay and perquisite consumption in terms of higher salaries, large 
office complexes, and other organizational support facilities. As a proxy of agency 
costs, SG&A shows the managers’ ability to manipulate expense to satisfy 
themselves. Therefore, the higher ratio of SG&A scaled by sales is, the higher agency 
costs are.  
ܣ�݁݊ܿݕ ܿ݋ݏݐͳ = ܣ݊݊ݑ݈ܽ ݏ݈ܽ݁ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ                                           ሺʹሻ ܣ�݁݊ܿݕ ܿ݋ݏݐʹ = ܵܩ&ܣܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ݏ݈ܽ݁ݏ                                            ሺ͵ሻ 
 
4.1.3 Information risk 
Information risk - the likelihood of the poor quality of disclosed firm-specific 
information related to the decision of the investor - is associated with a key 
accounting number – earnings, in other words, accruals quality. Accruals quality can 
be a reflection of earnings manipulation, which prevents investors from knowing the 
real condition of a firm. Therefore, poor accruals quality increases information risk. 
Our second set of firm performance variables relates to information risk. Previous 
studies have provided evidence of the relationship between CEO turnovers and 
accruals quality. Accruals quality may be associated with the age and tenure of a CEO 
(Alderfer, 1986). CEOs gain knowledge of the firm and the industry with the increase 
of their tenure and age. According to Allen (1981), there is a positive relationship 






only a relatively small block of stock. However, this managerial power could be a 
double-edged sword. On one hand, experienced CEOs enhance firm performance 
using their knowledge of the firm and industry. On the other hand, they could benefit 
themselves at their own sweet will without regard for the profit of shareholders. One 
of the figures they can manipulate, are accrual qualities. Indeed, Dechow and Sloan 
(1991) investigated that CEOs in their final year of service are more likely to manage 
short-term earnings and act myopically.   
In this paper, we conduct five measures of information risk. Following Antia et al. 
(2010), the first measure of information risk captures the abnormal performance by 
estimating the quality of accruals. We compute the standard deviation of firm-specific 
residuals from a regression of total accruals on lagged, contemporaneous and leading 
CFO (cash flow from operations), following Dechow and Dichev (2002) that stated 
that cash flows related to accruals are cash flow from operations.  
Following Dechow et al. (1995), firm i’s total current accruals (ܶܥܣ�,�) are defined as ܶܥܣ�,� = ∆ܥܣ�,� − ∆ܥܮ�,� − ∆ܥܣܵܪ�,� + ∆ܵܶܦܧܤ �ܶ,� − ܦܧܲ �ܰ,�               ሺͶሻ 
Where ܥܣ�,� = current assets, ܥܮ�,� = current liabilities, ܥܣܵܪ�,�= cash and short-term 
investment, ܵܶܦܧܤ �ܶ,�  = debt in current liabilities, and ܦܧܲ �ܰ,� is depreciation and 
amortization. 
By regressing ܶܥܣ�,� on lagged, contemporaneous and leading CFO, our first measure 







ܶܥܣ�,�ܶܣ�,� = ݇଴ + ݇ଵ ܥܨܱ�,�−ଵܶܣ�.� + ݇ଶ ܥܨܱ�,�ܶܣ�.� + ݇ଷ ܥܨܱ�,�+ଵܶܣ�.� + ℇ�,�                   ሺͷሻ 
The second measure of accruals quality (AQ2) uses the change of working capital 
( ∆�ܥ�,� ) instead of using ܶܥܣ�,� , to calculate firm-specific residuals (AQ2). 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), suggested that managers use working capital in 
earnings’ manipulation due to its use of inventory, accounts payables and receivables. 
Furthermore, accruals contain the changes in various working capital items. So, our 
second measure of accruals quality (AQ2) uses the change of working capital and is 
constructed as follow: ∆�ܥ�,�ܶܣ�,� = ݇଴ + ݇ଵ ܥܨܱ�,�−ଵܶܣ�.� + ݇ଶ ܥܨܱ�,�ܶܣ�.� + ݇ଷ ܥܨܱ�,�+ଵܶܣ�.� + ℇ�,�                ሺ͸ሻ 
The third measure of information risk, we add 2 extra variables, 1) the change of sales 
scaled by total assets and 2) property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets, into 
equation 6. (Francis et al., 2005; Antia et al., 2010) ∆�ܥ�,�ܶܣ�,� = ݇଴ + ݇ଵ ܥܨܱ�,�−ଵܶܣ�.� + ݇ଶ ܥܨܱ�,�ܶܣ�.� + ݇ଷ ܥܨܱ�,�+ଵܶܣ�.�  +݇ସ ∆ݏ݈ܽ݁ݏ�,�ܶܣ�.� + ݇ହ ܲܲܧ�,�ܶܣ�.� + ℇ�,�                                    ሺ͹ሻ 
We use two other methods to calculate the discretionary total current accruals, to 
measure accruals quality (DTCA). Discretionary total current accruals identify 
management choices while nondiscretionary current accruals reflect firm’s conditions 
such as firm growth and operating cycle (Dechow et al. 1995). Evidence from 
Subramanyam (1996) suggests that pervasive managerial discretion improves the 






accounting numbers. We follow Jones (1991)’s method, and use the predicted value of ݑ�,� as discretionary total current accruals (DTCA) from the following equation:  ݑ�,� = ܶܥܣ�,�ܶܣ�,�−ଵ − ሺ݇ଵ ͳܶܣ�,�−ଵ + ݇ଶ ∆ݏ݈ܽ݁ݏ�,�ܶܣ�,�−ଵ + ݇ଷ ܲܲܧ�,�ܶܣ�,�−ଵሻ                        ሺͺሻ 
 
We use in the last method of calculating DTCA the modified Jones model (Dechow et 
al., 1995) and use the predicted value of ݑ�,� as DTCA: ܶܥܣ�,�ܶܣ�,�−ଵ = ݇ଵ ͳܶܣ�,�−ଵ + ݇ଶ ∆ݏ݈ܽ݁ݏ�,� − ∆ܴܧܥ�,�ܶܣ�,�−ଵ + ݇ଷ ܲܲܧ�,�ܶܣ�,�−ଵ + ݑ�,�            ሺͻሻ 
 
Where ∆ܴܧܥ�,� is the net receivables in year t less the net receivables in year t-1. The 
only adjustment relative to the original Jones model (1991) is that the change in 
revenues is adjusted for the change in receivables. The modified Jones model 
emphasizes on the fact that it is easier to manage earnings by exercising discretion 
over the recognition of revenue on credit sales than it is to manage earnings by 
exercising discretion over the recognition of revenue on cash sales.  
4.1.4 Firm performance 
 There are several ways to measure firm performance. In this paper, we use Tobin’s Q 
as a measure of firm performance. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of a 
company’s assets divided by the replacement cost of the company’s assets (book 
value). A low Tobin’s Q ratio (between 0 and 1) means that the cost to replace a firm’s 
assets is greater than the market value. This indicates that either the stock is 






research finds that firms with high Tobin’s Q are always associated with better 
investment opportunities and higher growth. 
In this paper, we employ 2 definitions of Tobin’s Q in the model: 
ܶ݋ܾ�݊′ݏ ܳଵ = ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ                                       ሺͳͲሻ ܶ݋ܾ�݊′ݏ ܳଶ = ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ − �݊ݐܽ݊��ܾ݈݁ ܽݏݏ݁ݐ − �݋݋݀ݓ�݈݈          ሺͳͳሻ 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
4.2 Data and sample selection 
First, we obtain the CEO compensation data from the China Center for Economic 
Research Sinofin Information Service (CCER/SinoFin). Second, we gather the 
financial performance and accounting data from CSMAR database.   
As most state-owned enterprises transformed to private owned firms in 1990s, we 
restrict our initial sample to the years between 2004 and 2016. To be included in the 
sample for a given year, a firm must have accounting data of one year after and one 
year before to compute accruals quality. These data requirements restrict our final 
sample period to the years between 2005 and 2015.  
We took several steps to make our dependent variables easier to understand. We 






there are outliers in these 7 dependent variables1. We also adjust the winsorized value 
of AQ1, AQ3, AQ4 and AQ5 by multiplying them by 100,000. 
[Insert Table 2] 
We can see from Table 1 that the average age of top managers is around 49, and only 
11.5% of them are near retirement. 75% of general managers also serve as chairman 
of the board, which means managers have more power to control the firm. Compared 
with the average managerial ownership2 of 23.8% in the U.S. market, managerial 
shareholding in Chinese market only occupies 12.27%.  
[Insert Table 3] 
5. Methodology and results 
5.1 Multi-factor regression analysis 
To test the hypothesis in the background of China, we follow Antia’s method (2010), 
and conduct a two-step analysis: 1) regress the decision horizon (DH) on firm 
fundamentals and CEO compensation variables, and obtain the predicted value of DH 
(DHhat) from this regression, 2) regress DHhat on the firm performance variables and 
control variables.  
The relationship between decision horizon and firm performance may be endogenous: 
First, it is still a question whether a CEO who possesses a long-term decision horizon 
would lead to a boom in firm’s performance or a well-performed firm, firm with low 
                                                     
1 The lowest value of the AQ2 is -622.4077 while the mean of AQ2 is 22.37011 and the maximum is 
30.32925 






agency cost or information cost, would search for a younger top manager or non-
myopia manager. If we use an OLS model, the results could be biased, because of the 
endogeneity. Second, there might be some important firm characteristics missed in the 
model, which relate to CEO decision horizon. For example, if we missed R&D 
expenses in the model, which is naturally associated with long time horizons, an OLS 
model would exaggerate the impact of decision horizon and fail to capture the real 
reason. Therefore, I use two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation to estimate the 
coefficient because of the endogeneity of decision horizon and firm performance,  
The first stage: 
ܦܪ = �ଵ + �ଶܶ݋ܾ�݊′ݏ ܳ + �ଷ ܾ݉݁�ݐݏ݈ܽ݁ݏ + �ସ ܿܽ݌�ݐ݈ܽ ݁ݔ݌ܽ݊݀�ݐݑݎ݁ݏ݈ܽ݁ݏ+ �ହ ܴ&ܦ ݁ݔ݌݁݊݀�ݐݑݎ݁ݏ݈ܽ݁ݏ + �଺�ܿ݋݉݌ + �ହ logሺݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܿ݋݉݌݁݊ݏܽݐ�݋݊ሻ+ �଻ logሺݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏሻ + �଼ ݈݋݊� ݐ݁ݎ݉ ܾ݀݁ݐݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ + �݊ݏݐݎݑ݉݁݊ݐ݈ܽ   ሺͳʹሻ 
Where the variable ܫܿ݋݉݌ is the percentage of other CEOs who are paid more than 
the CEO in the same industry; and the instrumental is a variable that is not correlated 
with the error term in the second-stage model. Moreover, I use industry-averaged 
salary per capita as instrumental variable.  
[Insert Table 4] 
Table 4 reports the estimates of parameter of the first-stage regression of the 
dependent variable CEO’s decision horizon (DH). From the results, we can see that 






with Tobin’s Q, which supports the idea that good-performing firms usually hire 
CEOs who have long-term decision horizon. The reason why the first measure of 
Tobin’s Q gives us an insignificant estimator is that the first measure contains 
intangible assets and good will in the book-value of the firm which varies 
significantly among firms and which are not easy to manage by top managers. After 
detecting the reciprocal causality between CEO decision horizon and firm 
performance, we could find other variables that are highly correlated with the decision 
horizon. The coefficients of Icomp are significant and negatively associated with DH 
in both models. These results are not surprising. Aiming to have a higher salary, CEOs 
may jump to other firms in the same industry, so the decision horizon in the original 
firm would be shorter because of the departure. Firm size is significant and negatively 
correlated to DH in 1% level, which means CEO’s decision horizon in large firms are 
shorter than in small firms. This may be due to the fact that CEOs have more 
shareholders to satisfy in large firms, and they are more likely to act myopically. 
 
 
5.2 Empirical results 
5.2.1 CEO decision horizon and agency cost 
Our first hypothesis states that shorter CEO decision horizons are associated with 
greater agency cost. To conduct a test of this hypothesis, we have two measures of 







We conduct our second stage as follow: 
ܣ�݁݊ܿݕ ܿ݋ݏݐݏ = �଴ + �ଵܦܪℎܽݐ + �ଶ ܾ݉݁�ݐݏ݈ܽ݁ݏ + �ଷ ܿܽ݌�ݐ݈ܽ ݁ݔ݌ܽ݊݀�ݐݑݎ݁ݏ݈ܽ݁ݏ                                   +�ସ lnሺݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏሻ + �଺ܶݕ݌݁                                                                 +�଼age_dummy                                                             ሺͳ͵ሻ 
[Insert Table 5] 
Table 5 reports the results of the second stage, which use the estimated value of DH 
(DHhat) from equation (12) as independent variable. We find that the coefficient of 
CEO decision horizon is 0.009 and 0.011 respectively in the last two models in table 5 
and they are both significant at the 5% percent level. These results contradict with the 
results of Antia et al. (2010). Based on the data from American firms, Antia et al. 
(2010) found a negative relationship between CEO decision horizon and agency costs. 
However, in the Chinese market, this relationship is reversed. There are two reasons 
for this reversion. First, the measure we use in this study is SG&A scaled by total 
sales, which directly captures the expense used by top managers. At a same level of 
sales, the CEO’s expense increases with the decision horizon. Second, if the expected 
decision horizons are long, usually CEOs are more confident to stay in his firm than 
those CEOs with shorter decision horizon. The incentive to regulate themselves 
declines as CEOs confidence to stay at the company increases. Hence, agency costs 
increase with the increase of decision horizon.  
5.2.2 CEO decision horizon and information risk   






greater information risk. Given that CEO turnover is indicative of short decision 
horizon, and accruals quality is a proxy of information risk. We conduct our second 
stage regression as follow:  
ܣܳ = �଴ + �ଵܦܪℎܽݐ + �ଶ ܾ݉݁�ݐݏ݈ܽ݁ݏ + �ଷ ܿܽ݌�ݐ݈ܽ ݁ݔ݌ܽ݊݀�ݐݑݎ݁ݏ݈ܽ݁ݏ+ �ସ lnሺݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏሻ + �଺ ݈݋݊� ݐ݁ݎ݉ ܾ݀݁ݐݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ + �଻Type+ �଼age_dummy                                                                                     ሺͳͶሻ 
[Insert Table 6] 
Table 6 reports the results of the second stage regression which uses estimated value 
of DH (DHhat) from the first stage regression as an independent variable. The results 
of column (1) and column (3) reveal that the estimated coefficient of CEO decision 
horizon is positive and significant at 1% for the two measures of accruals quality. As 
the lower numbers of accruals quality represent lower degree of information risk, 
information risks are positively correlated with CEO’s expected tenure. 
These results contradict with the results of Antia et al. (2010), which state that 
decision horizon substantially mitigates the level of information risk that investors 
face. Decision horizon is a measure of management myopia, and there are several 
reasons for this reversal in the context of China: First, most CEO compensation items 
are restricted stocks not options. Restricted stocks are subject to strict conditions 
(such as net profit, return on net assets, earnings per share and other financial 






stocks, which may make CEOs manipulate accounting announcements in early years 
rather than just before their departure. Second, the market for professional managers 
is not well developed. The professional managers market is more like a sellers’ market 
in China, so top CEOs have more bargaining power and have less pressure to be 
replaced. Based on these two reasons, CEOs may manipulate financial statements in 
the early years and pose difficulty to investors to forecast the future prospects. 
Furthermore, we re-estimate the model after adding additional corporate governance 
variables. These variables are listed in column 2 and column 4. Some of these 
variables also manifest significant association with accruals quality. Particularly, 
according to Gul et al. (2010), we put Concentration as an indicator of ownership 
concentration, and this variable is positively correlated with accruals quality in both 
column 2 and column 4. This result suggests that not only concentrated ownership 
will push firms to take projects that serve large shareholders and managers’ interests 
(Dahya et al, 2008), but also concentrated ownership will increase the information 
risk that other investors face. We also found a negative correlation between capital 
expenditure (CAPX) and accruals quality in all 4 models, because the increase of 
capital expenditure is always associated with valuable investment opportunities which 
could positively affect share prices and increase the transparency of financial 
announcement.  
We also report the results using other three methods of calculating accruals quality. 






Hausman score is 1.72982 (p = 0.1888), AQ4’s score is 4.67189 (p = 0.0310), AQ5’s 
score is 0.261374 (p=0.6093). The only model that passes the Wu-Hausman test is the 
model with AQ4, and we do not need to consider the endogeneity problem between 
AQ4 and DH. Therefore, we still need to use 2SLS model for AQ3 and AQ5.  
Table 6 panel B shows the results of these additional three models. As we can see 
from the table, only AQ4 gave us a significant coefficient (-0.000686) of CEO 
decision horizon, but only at the 10% level and it is close to 0. The other two models 
gave us insignificant coefficients for our main test variable.  
Compared to their previous research, Dechow and Dichev (2002) extended their 
accruals map into the related cash flow, and provided more precise estimates of 
accruals quality. We also use their method in AQ1 and AQ2, which could partially 
explain why AQ1 and AQ2 gave us more significant results.  
5.2.3 CEO decision horizon and firm performance 
Since the regression results show that CEO decision horizon is positively associated 
with information risk and agency costs, it is reasonable to test the relationship 
between CEO decision horizon and firm performance as we stated in hypothesis 3.  
To test H3, the second stage regression would be: 
ܶ݋ܾ�݊′ݏ ܳ = �଴ + �ଵܦܪℎܽݐ + �ଶ ܾ݉݁�ݐݏ݈ܽ݁ݏ + �ଷ ܿܽ݌�ݐ݈ܽ ݁ݔ݌ܽ݊݀�ݐݑݎ݁ݏ݈ܽ݁ݏ+ �ସ lnሺݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏሻ + �଺ ݈݋݊� ݐ݁ݎ݉ ܾ݀݁ݐݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ+ �଼AgeDummy                                                                                        ሺͳͷሻ 






[Insert Table 7] 
Table 7 reports the estimates of the coefficients of the second-stage model.  We can 
see that CEO decision horizons is positively associated with Tobin’s Q in all four 
models at the 1% level. As intangible assets and goodwill are not included in the book 
value, the models in columns (3) and (4) gave us higher coefficients of decision 
horizon.  These findings are interesting, because even though the results of H1 and H2 
contradict with Antia et al.'s (2010) results, the results of H3 are the same. 
Furthermore, most of the other controls are consistent with Antia et al. (2010): market 
valuation is positively related to size (Size) and profitability (MEBIT) and negatively 
related to leverage (Lev).  
6. Robustness tests 
In this section, we present several robustness tests to ensure that our significant results 
are not due to the specific measure of decision horizon and other control variables. We 
employ an alternative measure of decision horizon, which uses the difference between 
industry median CEO’s age and the age of CEO: ܦܪʹ = ܣܩܧ���,� − ܣܩܧ�,�                                                ሺͳ͸ሻ 
[Insert Table 8] 
Table 8 reports the results of alternative measure of CEO decision horizon using age 
difference (DH2) as a measure of decision horizon. All sign of our main test variable 
are still the same, except for the coefficient of DH in the first column of Table 8. In 






However, the coefficient of DH2 in column 1 becomes significant and negative as the 
first measure of agency cost uses asset turnover ratio. This negative coefficient also 
suggests that agency cost increases with the increase of decision horizon, as asset 
turnover ratio captures the ability of CEO to employ firm’s assets and the sign of this 
ratio should be opposite to the agency cost.   
Furthermore, we use several other measures of ownership concentration and 
managerial ownership. The alternative measures of ownership concentration are as 
follow: the percentage shares owned by the largest shareholder (Largest_SH), the 
percentage shares of largest five shareholders (Top5_SH), the percentage shares of 
largest ten shareholders (Top10_SH), the Herfindahl index of the largest three stakes 
(sh_herf3), the Herfindahl index of the largest 5 stakes (sh_herf5) and the square of 
the largest stake (sh_herf). Alternative measures of ownership concentration do not 
change the sign and significance level of the coefficient of our main test variable. For 
all our regression models, we use alternative managerial ownership measure, which is 
the square of the percentage shares owned by directors, supervisors and managers. 
The results remain the same. Hence, we conclude that our results are robust.  
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, I examine the relationship between CEO decision horizon and firm 
performance. As a proxy of managerial myopia, CEO decision horizons are the sum 
of CEO’s expected tenure, and their age compared with the median age in the same 






Our findings support H3, which state that shorter CEO decision horizons are 
associated with smaller market valuation. Contrary to the paper of Antia et al. (2010), 
we find positive correlations both between CEO decision horizons and agency costs 
and between CEO decision horizons and information risk.  For those with a low F 
value in Wu-Hausman tests, we use the 2SLS model to control for the endogeneity 
problems. We also use an alternative measure of decision horizon and several other 
measures of controls as robustness test and conclude that our findings are robust. The 
opposite results may be attributed to the unique characteristics of the Chinese market 
namely: a) most CEO compensation items are restricted stocks instead of options, 
which would encourage them to manipulate or smooth earnings in early years rather 
than just before their departure; b) the professional managers market is a seller’s 
market in China, which gives top managers more bargaining power with less fear of 
replacement. 
There are still some limitation to this study due to the massive missing value of CEO 
compensation and R&D expenses. In fact, we only have 824 observations after 
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Table 1: Correlation matrix  
















DH 1              
Agency_cost1 0.097 1             
Agency_cost2 -0.002 -0.187 1            
AQ1 0.013 0.124 -0.004 1           
AQ2 0.075 0.001 0.029 0.023 1          
AQ3 0.017 0.094 -0.030 0.091 0.442 1         
AQ4 0.027 0.029 0.012 0.035 0.032 -0.017 1        
AQ5 -0.046 -0.018 -0.055 -0.001 0.008 -0.003 0.078 1       
Tobin Q1 0.111 0.039 -0.042 0.012 0.071 0.037 0.028 0.019 1      
Tobin Q2 0.130 0.050 -0.064 0.009 0.067 0.039 0.051 0.022 0.937 1     
Independence 0.028 0.024 -0.033 0.101 0.063 0.091 0.003 0.071 -0.011 -0.024 1    
Dsm-percent -0.040 0.061 -0.033 0.082 0.031 -0.004 0.035 0.061 -0.114 -0.019 0.105 1   
Concentration 0.015 0.061 0.027 0.071 0.092 -0.049 0.118 -0.007 -0.030 -0.036 0.002 0.095 1  









Table 2: Summary Statistics  
Table 2 provides the summary statistics of our main test variables and control variables from 
2005 to 2015, which includes the number of observations, mean, median, min, max and 
standard deviation.  
VARIABLES Obs Mean Median Min Max Std. 
DH 824 -0.127 1.137 -30.855 27.365 8.066 
Agency_cost1 824 0.017 0.030 -0.804 0.226 0.118 
Agency_cost2 820 0.051 0.039 0.000 0.892 0.064 
AQ1 824 0.044 0.043 -0.272 0.344 0.093 
AQ2 824 -2.303 -1.353 -74.067 2.538 7.760 
AQ3 824 0.044 0.070 -2.005 0.581 0.251 
AQ4 804 0.054 0.054 -0.200 0.279 0.077 
AQ5 804 0.066 0.063 -0.259 0.511 0.100 
Tobin1 824 3.027 2.259 0.024 29.169 2.63 
Tobin2 824 3.355 2.407 0.025 29.390 3.17 
Independence 824 0.372 0.333 0.182 0.667 0.056 
Dsm-percent 786 0.123 0.002 0.000 0.985 0.253 
Concentration 824 46.980 46.809 12.367 91.824 15.508 
MEBIT 824 0.146 0.127 -0.650 0.690 0.115 
CAPX 824 0.002 0.002 -0.153 0.413 0.032 
R&D 824 0.047 0.034 0.000 0.983 0.063 
Icomp 824 0.038 0.486 0.000 0.533 0.073 
Ecomp 824 2.124 0.001 -4.887 3.808 2.739 
Size 824 21.391 21.207 18.610 25.749 1.011 











Table 3: Numbers of Decision Horizons by Year and by Industry 
Table 3 Panel A reports the numbers of Decision Horizons by year. Panel B reports the 
numbers of Decision horizons by industry. The Mean, Median, Min, Max and Standard 
Deviation are also included in the table.  
Panel A: Numbers of Decision Horizons by Year 
Years Obs Mean Median Min Max Std. 
2005 10 -4.462 -4.686 -9.68 0.307 7.062 
2006 16 -0.011 2.312 -13.965 11.312 7.878 
2007 4 -0.103 0.719 -8.132 6.278 7.002 
2008 40 -0.137 -0.745 -12.408 16.187 7.823 
2009 19 0.049 2.020 -18.161 16.446 9.195 
2010 69 0.903 1.250 -19.389 20.953 7.483 
2011 108 0.648 1.634 -19.638 18.195 6.662 
2012 113 -0.171 2.417 -30.855 14.710 8.355 
2013 142 -0.291 0.628 -26.530 21.500 8.569 
2014 136 -0.877 -0.117 -23.780 16.857 7.54 
2015 165 -0.246 1.396 -26.150 27.365 8.913 
Total 824 -0.127 1.137 -30.855 27.365 8.066 
Panel B: Numbers of Decision Horizons by Industry 
Industry Obs Mean Median Min Max Std. 
001 15 -5.870 -1.687 -26.150 9.500 10.602 
002 133 0.625 1.950 -23.780 18.195 7.007 
003 148 0.312 1.299 -18.281 14.232 6.853 
004 22 -0.914 -2.597 -15.604 27.365 9.573 
005 386 -0.087 0.090 -26.530 21.500 8.369 
006 120 -0.774 0.322 -30.855 19.545 8.711 







Table 4: First stage of 2SLS model 
Table 2 reports the results of the first stage of 2SLS model. All the variable definitions are in 
the appendix. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES DH DH 
   
Tobin1 0.180  
 (0.141)  
Tobin2  0.246** 
  (0.114) 
MEBIT -3.054 -3.423 
 (2.561) (2.546) 
CAPX 5.268 5.041 
 (10.61) (10.57) 
R&D 1.163 0.368 
 (4.897) (4.896) 
Icomp -1.966* -1.939* 
 (1.114) (1.111) 
Ecomp -0.000576 -0.000586 
 (0.000595) (0.000594) 
Size -1.408*** -1.317*** 
 (0.339) (0.337) 
Lev 2.642 2.828 
 (4.841) (4.822) 
Constant 25.531*** 23.354** 
 (9.689) (9.654) 
Observations 824 824 






   Table 5: Decision Horizon and Agency Costs 
In Table 3, the dependent variables are 2 measures of agency costs. All the variable 
definitions are in the appendix. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Agency cost1 Agency cost1 Agency cost2 Agency cost2 
     
DHhat 0.000542 -0.002 0.009** 0.011** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) 
MEBIT 0.023 0.030 -0.022 -0.025 
 (0.039) (0.040) (0.022) (0.022) 
CAPX -0.210 -0.187 -0.071 -0.090 
 (0.174) (0.180) (0.095) (0.099) 
Size 0.004 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) 
Lev 0.090 0.083 -0.015 -0.003 
 (0.074) (0.077) (0.041) (0.042) 
Concentration  0.000501*  0.001 
  (0.000)  (0.002) 
Sameperson  -0.007  0.0013 
  (0.011)  (0.006) 
Independence  0.034  -0.035 
  (0.077)  (0.042) 
Dsm-percent  0.024  -0.008 
  (0.018)  (0.010) 
Type -0.005 0.003 -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.007) (0.008) 
AgeDummy 0.017 0.0155 -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant -0.064 -0.109 0.103 0.112 
 (0.144) (0.152) (0.080) (0.085) 














(p = 0.000)Observations 824 784 82  78  R-squared 0.019 0.028 0.014 0.017 







Table 6: Decision horizon and Information risk 
In Table 4, the dependent variables are 2 measures of accruals quality. Column (1) and column (3) 
document the estimated coefficients of equation (14). We add 4 other firm characters in column 
(2) and column (4). All the variable definitions are in the appendix. Bm1 and bm2 are dummies 
when B/M ratio belongs to first tertile and middle tertile respectively. Sqdsm= square of the 
percentage of shares held by directors, supervisors and managers. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
Panel A: First two measures of Accruals quality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 AQ1 AQ1 AQ2 AQ2 
     
DHhat 0.020*** 0.0186*** 1.428*** 1.383*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.470) (0.471) 
MEBIT 0.016 0.0194 -6.277** -5.876** 
 (0.030) (0.0303) (2.468) (2.463) 
CAPX -0.239* -0.231* -19.180* -19.760* 
 (0.135) (0.135) (10.970) (10.982) 
Size -0.003 -0.003 -0.330 -0.386 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.321) (0.322) 
Lev -0.0006 0.0002 -7.679 -7.901* 
 (0.058) (0.058) (4.676) (4.692) 
Sameperson  -0.014*  -0.972 
  (0.008)  (0.648) 
Independence  0.134**  6.852 
  (0.058)  (4.735) 
Sqdsm  0.010  -0.399 
  (0.015)  (1.229) 
Concentration  0.000409*  0.050*** 
  (0.000212)  (0.017) 
Type 0.018* 0.020* 0.474 0.536 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.837) (0.838) 
AgeDummy 0.006 0.007 1.095 1.171 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.929) (0.926) 
Bm1 -0.017 -0.017 1.743* 1.703* 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.927) (0.929) 
Bm2 -0.008 -0.007 1.771** 1.773** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.750) (0.748) 
Constant 0.021 -0.025 8.195 5.075 
 (0.112) (0.116) (9.099) (9.414) 
     
Observations 824 822 824 822 
R-squared 0.035 0.053 0.085 0.101 





Panel B: 3 additional measures of Accruals quality. 
 (5) (6) (7) 
 AQ3 AQ4 AQ5 
    
DHhat -0.039  -0.006 
 (0.029)  (0.011) 
DH  -0.000686*  
  (0.000415)  
MEBIT 0.034 0.012 0.034 
 (0.086) (0.026) (0.034) 
CAPX 0.542 0.052 0.158 
 (0.508) (0.102) (0.199) 
Size 0.008 -0.005 0.010* 
 (0.013) (0.003) (0.005) 
Lev -0.345** -0.025 0.041 
 (0.161) (0.050) (0.065) 
Sameperson -0.010 0.001 -0.012 
 (0.023) (0.007) (0.009) 
Independence 0.458*** 0.005 0.120* 
 (0.166) (0.049) (0.065) 
Dsm-percent 0.003 0.010 0.014 
 (0.040) (0.012) (0.016) 
Concentration -0.001 0.000614*** -0.00043 
 (0.001) (0.000183) (0.000237) 
Type 0.0174 0.005 0.002 
 (0.027) (0.009) (0.011) 
AgeDummy 0.007 0.002 0.006 
 (0.032) (0.011) (0.013) 
Constant -0.324 0.082 -0.195 
 (0.338) (0.079) (0.136) 
Wu-Hausman tests 1.730 
(p = 0.189) 
4.671 
(p = 0.031) 
0.261 
(p=0.6093) 
Model 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Observations 784 766 766 
R-squared 0.007 0.064 0.027 





Table 7: Decision horizon and market valuation 
In Table 5, the dependent variables are 2 measures of Tobin’s Q. Column (1) and column (3) 
document the estimated coefficients of equation (15). All the variable definitions are in the 
appendix. We add 4 other firm characters in column (2) and column (4). *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Tobin’s Q 1 Tobin’s Q 1 Tobin’s Q 2 Tobin’s Q 2 
     
DHhat 0.765*** 0.779*** 1.010*** 1.028*** 
 (0.049) (0.051) (0.059) (0.061) 
MEBIT 5.693*** 5.692*** 6.680*** 6.641*** 
 (0.558) (0.572) (0.673) (0.689) 
CAPX -6.268*** -6.043** -3.559 -3.239 
 (2.260) (2.356) (2.728) (2.836) 
Size 0.305*** 0.310*** 0.484*** 0.498*** 
 (0.096) (0.102) (0.116) (0.122) 
Lev -6.450*** -6.709*** -7.216*** -7.462*** 
 (1.081) (1.128) (1.305) (1.358) 
AgeDummy 0.360* 0.310 0.456* 0.340 
 (0.216) (0.222) (0.261) (0.268) 
Sameperson  -0.164  -0.229 
  (0.157)  (0.189) 
Independence  -2.058*  -3.176** 
  (1.136)  (1.367) 
Dsm-percent  0.311  0.347 
  (0.271)  (0.326) 
Concentration  0.001  -0.001 
  (0.004)  (0.005) 
Constant -5.409** -4.688* -9.369*** -8.309*** 
 (2.451) (2.613) (2.958) (3.146) 
     
Observations 824 784 824 784 
R-squared 0.565 0.567 0.563 0.566 






Table 8: Robustness Tests 
In table 6, the dependent variables are 2 measures of agency costs and 2 measures of 
accruals quality. Our main test variable DH2 is measured by the difference between industry 
median CEO’s age and the age of CEO. Bm1 and bm2 are dummies when B/M ratio 
belongs to first tertile and middle tertile respectively. *, **, and *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Agency cost 1 Agency cost 2 AQ1 AQ2 
     
DH2 -0.147*** 0.148*** 0.162*** 4.953* 
 (0.056) (0.048) (0.051) (2.881) 
MEBIT -0.052 0.047 0.100* -3.404 
 (0.061) (0.047) (0.056) (3.156) 
CAPX 1.078** -1.253*** -1.381*** -47.630* 
 (0.521) (0.436) (0.471) (26.660) 
Size 0.044*** -0.041*** -0.043*** -1.705** 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.847) 
Lev 0.114 -0.054 -0.072 -11.421** 
 (0.103) (0.080) (0.093) (5.258) 
Independence 0.170 -0.161* -0.007 2.641 
 (0.115) (0.090) (0.104) (5.877) 
Dsm-percent 0.046* -0.029 -0.006 -0.075 
 (0.026) (0.020) (0.024) (1.335) 
Concentration 0.000257 0.000429 0.000519 0.056*** 
 (0.000384) (0.000309) (0.000348) (0.020) 
Type 0.020 -0.017 -0.000 0.387 
 (0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.848) 
AgeDummy -0.001 0.013 0.027 1.745 
 (0.021) (0.017) (0.019) (1.098) 
Bm1 0.089*** -0.076*** -0.093*** -1.447 
 (0.033) (0.027) (0.030) (1.702) 
Bm2 0.057*** -0.039** -0.047** 0.183 
 (0.022) (0.018) (0.020) (1.121) 
Constant -1.182*** 1.135*** 1.123*** 36.220 
 (0.431) (0.366) (0.390) (22.060) 
     
Observations 784 780 784 784 






A1: Variable Definitions  
Variable Description 
Age CEOs’ age 
DH CEO’s decision horizon as described above 
Agency cost1 Annual sales scaled by total assets (winsorized at 1% level) 
Agency cost2 SG&A scaled by sales (winsorized at 1% level) 
AQ1 Firm-specific residuals from a regression of total current accruals (ܶܥܣ�,�) on lagged, contemporaneous and leading CFO 
AQ2 Firm-specific residuals from a regression of change of working capital (∆�ܥ�,�) on lagged, contemporaneous and leading CFO 
AQ3 
Firm-specific residuals from a regression of change of working capital 
(∆�ܥ�,�) on lagged, contemporaneous, leading CFO, change of sales 
and PP&E(property plant and equipment) 
AQ4 Discretionary total current accruals (DTCA) using the Jones model (Jones, 1991) 
AQ5 Discretionary total current accruals (DTCA) using modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) 
Tobin1 Market value / total asset 
Tobin2 Market value / (total asset – intangible asset - goodwill) 
Independence  Number of independent board member / number of total board member. 
Dsm-percent The percentage of shares held by directors, supervisors and managers. 
Concentration Ownership concentration measured by the sum of percentage of the 
largest 3 shareholders of the firm. 
MEBIT MEBIT scaled by total sales 
CAPX Capital expenditure scaled by total sales 
R&D Research and development expenditure scaled by total sales 
Icomp The percentage of other CEOs who are paid more than the CEO in the same industry 
Ecomp The log form of total compensation scaled by wage 
Size The log form of total assets 
Type Mark as 1 if the firm is state-owned enterprises, 0 otherwise 
AgeDummy Mark as 1 if the CEO’s age is between 62 and 65, 0 otherwise 
Sameperson Mark as 1 if chairman of board is the general manager, 0 otherwise 
Lev Long-term-debt scaled by total assets 
 
